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INTRODUCTION:
The United States is currently undergoing two periods of simultaneous transition -the first involving significant changes in the international environment, the second centered around a transformation in the U.S. domestic political agenda. Within the context of these transitional events, the Clinton Administration is now being forced to deal with exceptionally complex situations involving the potential use of U.S. military force without the benefit of a workable framework for use of force decision making.
In the view of the author, the absence of such a framework deprives the country's leadership of a critically essential tool of national security policy. Without further delay, this administration must move toward the establishment of a use of force philosophy that will enable it to engage in focused decision making concerning the commitment of U.S. force abroad in the ambiguous international environment of today's world.
At the very core of this issue lie two basic questions:
Is the U.S. prepared to signal its commitment to remain engaged globally, in a post-Cold War world, by continuing to use military force abroad?
If so, when, where, and in what manner will the U.S. engage in the use of such force in the future?
This paper will examine efforts currently under way within the U.S. to respond to these questions. In doing so, it will focus on recent use of force pronouncements made by the Bush and Clinton administrations. Upon completing this analysis, the author will then offer both a use of force philosophy and clearly defined, "interest driven", criteria which may be used in addressing contemporary use of force scenarios.
The Weinberger Use of Force Criteria
In examining the current debate concerning the appropriate use of U.S. force abroad, it is useful to recall that previous efforts have been made to articulate use of force criteria. The most recent and widely cited criteria are those set forth by then
Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, in 1984:
(I) No commitment of forces to combat overseas unless the engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
(2) Any insertion of combat forces should be done wholeheartedly with the intention of winning.
There should be no commitment of forces unless we are willing to commit enough resources to achieve our objectives. The use of limited resources to achieve limited aims is appropriate.
(3) A commitment of forces requires clearly defined political and military objectives.
We should know how these forces can achieve the objectives.
(4) The relationship between the size, composition and disposition of committed forces and our objectives must be continuously reassessed and adjusted if necessary. When conditions and objectives change during a conflict, so must our combat requirements.
(5) Prior to a commitment of American forces, there should be some reasonable assurance of public and congressional support.
(6) The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort. ~ Formulated in the context of Cold War events -the U.S. military involvement in Grenada, the terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marines' barracks in Beirut, and active U.S. engagement in Central America, these use of force criteria were clearly intended to limit those situations in which U.S. forces would become involved.
In a running, and often public, debate with Secretary Weinberger, then Secretary of State George Shultz viewed these criteria as far too restrictive.
In his view, the numerous regional and local conflicts then underway in the world -"grayarea challenges" -affected important U.S. and Western interests and demanded U.S. attention.
...
[M]uch of the developing world is torn by the continuing struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of radicalism -a struggle actively exploited and exacerbated by the Soviet Union.
It is absurd to think that America can walk away from such challenges .... [T]he United States...must meet its responsibility as a defender of freedom, democratic values and international peace .... [W] e have learned that to maintain peace and preserve freedom we have to be strong, and...we have to be willing to use our strength.
We must be wise and prudent in deciding how and where to use our power; the United States will always seek political solutions to problems. Such solutions will never succeed, however, unless aggression is resisted and diplomacy is backed by strength. 2
The Weinberger -Shultz debate concerning the appropriate use of U.S. military force was never fully resolved.
Nevertheless, the "Weinberger Criteria" were often looked to as a reasonable formula for use of force decision making.
Freed now, however, of a mindset dictated by East-West confrontation, it is essential that we define a use of force philosophy and implementing criteria that move us beyond the Weinberger approach and provide current U.S. policy makers with a decisional framework more suited to the vagaries of the post-Cold War world.
The Bush Administration And Military force is never a tool to be used lightly or universally.
In some circumstances, it may be essential; in others, counterproductive.
I know that many people would like to find some formula, some easy formula, to apply, to tell us with precision when and where to intervene with force.
Anyone looking for scientific certitude is in for a disappointment.
In the complex new world we are entering, there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force.
Inevitably, the question of military intervention requires judgement.
Each and every case is unique. To adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and American lives and would give would-be troublemakers a blueprint for determining their own actions.
It could signal U.S. friends and allies that our support was not to be counted on.
And similarly, we cannot always decide in advance which interests will require our using military force to protect them.
The relative importance of an interest is not a quide.
Military force may not be the best way of safequardinq somethinq vital, while usinq force miqht be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important, but less than vital.
( Once we are satisfied that force makes sense, we must act with the maximum possible support.
The United States can and should lead, but we will want to act in concert, where possible, involving the United Nations or other multinational groupings.
The United States can and should contribute to the common undertaking .... but others should also contribute militarily .... providing combat or support forces, access to facilities or bases, or overflight rights.
And...others should contribute economically. 13
Then -perhaps mindful of the recently expressed views of The "Bush Doctrine" regarding the use of U.S. military force abroad may thus be summarized as follows:
(i) The U.S. is prepared to use military force as a complement to, or a temporary alternative for, diplomacy.
(2) The U.S. will not make use of force determinations on the basis of rigid criteria that are exclusively "interest driven".
(3) In keeping with this fact, the U.S. will not uniformly determine and articulate, in advance, those national interests which will be protected by the use of military force.
(4) Within this framework, the U.S. will consider the use of force when:
* the stakes warrant the use of force; 17 * force can be effective; * no other policies -political, diplomatic, or economic -appear likely to be effective; * the application of force can be limited in scope and in time;
* the potential benefits justify the potential costs; * it is possible to frame a precise and realistically achievable mission -and an equally realistic plan for the accomplishment of the mission; and * realistic criteria can be established for determining mission completion and the concomitant withdrawal of U.S. forces.
(5) The U.S. is prepared to take the lead in use of force situations, but prefers to act in concert, when possible, with the U.N. or alternative multinational coalitions. i0 (6) The U.S. is prepared to contribute its proportionate share of manpower and assets to common use of force activities; however, other states must also contribute militarily or economically. Even those who debate these matters, however, do so within the bounds of a commonly shared belief that such decisions must be "interest driven". That is, agreement does exist that U.S. military force should be used abroad for the purpose of promoting or protecting U.S. "national interests". 36 Rather, it is the ongoing argument over what these interests are, the relative importance of these interests, and the circumstances under which these interests should be promoted or protected by the use of military force that must be resolved.
In the view of the author, the Bush Administration has articulated a use of force philosophy that can, with further refinement, serve as an effective decision making framework for current U.S. policy makers.
In January 1993, the Bush Administration identified the following U.S. national security interests:
The survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
* A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
* Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
* A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish. 37
Though broad in nature, these national interests represent a starting point from which informed use of force decisions can be made.
Within the context of these broadly defined interests, however, more specific U.S. national interests must be identified -interests that reflect the domestic and international political realities of today's world. 38
In view of these realities, the U.S. must limit its national interests and political objectives to achievable goals. Thus, in defining these interests, the U.S. will be required to demonstrate both the patience and political maturity to selectively establish long-term, permanent interests, rather than "interests du jour" driven by misplaced emotionalism, TV images, and the widely diverse agendas of the international community. (i) The U.S. is prepared to use military force as a complement to, or a temporary alternative for, diplomacy.
(2)
The U.S. will make use of force determinations on the basis of clearly defined criteria crafted to enable decision makers to assess whether -in view of the specifically identified U.S. national interest at issue -it is necessary or, if not necessary, prudent to use force to protect or promote the interest concerned, s°
The U.S. will not articulate, in advance, specific situations in which it will or will not consider the use of force to protect or promote its national interests, sl (4) Within this framework, the U.S. will consider the use of force when: * a situation arises in which a specifically identified U.S. national interest is involved; * no other non-use of force policies -political, diplomatic, or economic -have proven to be or appear likely to be effective; * the application of an appropriate $2 degree of force is likely to be effective; * the potential benefits justify the potential human and fiscal costs; s3 * it is possible to frame a precise and realistically achievable military mission, based on clearly defined political objectives -and an equally realistic plan for the timely s4 accomplishment of this mission; and * realistic criteria can be established for determining mission completion and the concomitant withdrawal of U.S. forces. (5) The U.S. is prepared to act in concert with the U.N. or alternative multinational coalitions in dealing with use of force situations -subject to previously agreed fiscal and command and control arrangements. 55
The U.S. is prepared to contribute its proportionate share of manpower and assets to commonly agreed use of force activities; however, other states must also contribute militarily and/or economically.
The U.S. reserves the right to engage in the legitimate unilateral use of force in order to protect or promote its national interests.
As previously noted, the author recommends that the U.S. not resort to the use of military force for purposes of "humanitarian intervention,", i.e., the promotion of democracy or the protection of human rights.
If, indeed, U.S. forces are to be used for humanitarian purposes, these actions should be limited to low-risk, multinational, relief operations undertaken for purely humanitarian reasons. In these situations, a slightly modified version of the relevant criteria set forth by President
Bush in his discussion of the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia should guide U.S. actions.
When many lives are at stake, and no international relief aqency is capable of dealinq with the situation, the U.S. will be prepared to consider the limited deployment of U.S. forces when these personnel, buttressed by the forces of other countries, and acting under the full authority of the United Nations, could make an immediate and dramatic difference, and do so without excessive levels of risks and cost. s6
Again, however, for the reasons indicated above, s7 the author would advise U.S. decision makers to exercise caution in undertaking these forms of U.N. missions -and to do so only after agreement has been reached concerning the specific nature of the mission and appropriate fiscal and command and control arrangements have been codified.
Conclusion
The author has set forth a use of force philosophy and implementing criteria that may serve as a decision making framework for the current administration as it seeks to reach judgments concerning the commitment of U.S. force abroad. This philosophy and these criteria are offered with the full knowledge that no set of "rules" can guarantee success or serve as an adequate substitute for sound judgment based on experience and common sense. Absent the use of this framework as a starting 
3.
Jim Wolffe, "Cheney urges successor to keep military strong", Army Times ii January 1993: 8.
4. Wolffe 8.
5.
The President had earlier delivered a valedictory address at Texas A&M University on December 15, 1992, during which he had very broadly dealt with the use of force issue. 1-2.
7. Bush 2.
8. Bush 2.
9. Bush 2.
10. Bush 2-3. In the author's view, the President's thesis would have been better served had he asserted that "the relative importance of an interest" cannot serve as an exclusive guide to the use of military force.
ii.
The scale of priorities most frequently assigned to U.S. national interests follows:
(I) survival interests -the very existence of the nation is in peril; (2) vital interestsprobable serious harm to the security and well-being of the nation will result if strong measures, to include military action, are not taken within a short period of time; (3) major interests -potential serious harm would come to the nation if no action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad; and (4) peripheral (minor) interests -little, if any, harm to the nation will result if a "wait and see" policy is adopted.
For a detailed discussion of the subject of "interest analysis," see Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted:
United States National Interests in the 1980's (Lexington:
The University of Kentucky Press, 1985) 1-17.
The reader should be aware of the fact that the term, "vital interests," is commonly, but mistakenly, used in referring to U.S. "national interests" as a whole.
This term is best understood as but one sub-set of such interests.
Additionally, the reader should bear in mind this scale of "interest priorities" as the author speaks to the necessity for criteria for the future use of U.S. military force abroad to be "interest driven." 12.
Bush 3.
In the author's view, the President's forced distinction between "criteria" (to be rejected) and use of force "guidelines" is a distinction without a difference. The President's "guidelines" are, in fact, use of force "criteria".
13.
14. See text, p. 5, for Cheney's comments. Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood?
Have all other nonviolent policy means failed?
Will miliary force achieve the objective? At what cost?
Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?
...When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces.
These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives.
We can and do operate in murky, unpredictable circumstances.
But we also recognize that military force is not always the right answer.
If force is used imprecisely or out of frustration rather than clear analysis, the situation can be made worse.
26.
Towell 82. Among others, General Colin Powell has often been associated with this "overwhelming force" school of thought. This "buzz word" misrepresents General Powell's views on this subject, however.
In his words, "Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if they are not always possible .... If our objective is something short of winning -as in our air strikes into Libya in 1986 -we should see our objective clearly, then achieve it swiftly and efficiently."
Powell 40.
27. Towell 82. In Mr. Aspin's view, two recent developments support the viability of such limited operations:
(i) No longer locked in a mortal rivalry with the former Soviet Union, the U.S. can intervene in a trouble spot without fear that anything less than a total U.S. victory would be perceived as a sign of weakness; (2) Precision-guided "smart bombs" make it easier to destroy such targets as command posts, power grids and communications nodes "...with little, if any, loss of U.S. lives and with a minimum of collateral damage and loss of civilian lives on the other side."
General Powell has challenged this concept.
"We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack.
When the "surgery" is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts comes forward with talk of just a little escalation .... " Powell 40.
28.
Towell 
36.
As reflected in comments cited in the text of this paper, the use of U.S. military force to promote or protect U.S. national interests is an issue upon which both the past and current administrations agree. 
39.
For a discussion of the reduction in U.S. military manpower, see American Sentinel 21 February 1993: 3.
For an analysis of the reduction in the DoD budget, see National Journal 27 February 1993: 517.
40.
Ted Carpenter appears to have been the first commentator to have referred to the U.S. as a potential world "social worker" See Carpenter 24.
41.
For an excellent discussion of the dangers inherent in use of force intervention for humanitarian purposes, see Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists", Foreiqn Affairs -The Year 43. These "limited" national interests essentially parallel those articulated by Robert J. Art in an excellent article in which he proposes a future defense policy for the U.S. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense", International Security Spring 1991:
9.
Other well reasoned arguments have also been put forward for the adoption of more narrowly focused, "permanent" U.S. national interests.
See James Schlesinger, "Quest For A Post-Cold War Foreign Policy", Foreiqn Affairs -The Year Ahead 1993:
17-28. The author does not discount the fact that unforeseen events, beyond the scope of these limited national interests, may well require the use of U.S. military force abroad.
These situations must be addressed on a case-bycase basis -but, as an exception, -not as a rule.
44.
The "intensity" of a national interest depends upon the level of concern the U.S. may have regarding a particular interest at a given time and the extent to which it deems it necessary to defend or enhance this interest through the use of force.
See Nuechterlein 9.
45.
Or -to paraphrase President Bush: the use of force?" "Do the 'stakes' warrant 46.
For example, a humanitarian and political interest in seeking resolutions to ongoing conflicts within sovereign states exceeds any responsibilities or rights to intervene in such situations conferred by relevant international law.
Indeed, interventions in such conflicts violate the specific U.N. Charter provision (Article 2, paragraph 7) prohibiting intervention in the domestic affairs of member states.
The author is aware that a counter (pro-humanitarian intervention) argument can be made. For example, Michael Reisman has long contended that the U.N. has the duty to promote and encourage self-determination and human rights.
Thus, he argues, individual states are entitled to uphold these rights by intervening to enforce them.
In such cases, Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter (which prohibits aggression or threats of aggression) should not be construed to bar unilateral actions against repressive regimes.
In the view of the author, this return to the Justinian concept of "just war" is subject to significant abuse -providing powerful states with an almost unlimited "right" to overthrow governments adjudged "unfit" to govern. 49. See text, pp. i0-Ii.
50.
When a U.S. national "survival" interest is not in issue, it may or may not be "necessary" to engage in the use of force to protect lesser U.S. national interests -even an interest considered to be "vital" in nature.
However, in assessinq the use of force criteria set forth in (4), decision makers may, nevertheless, deem it "prudent" to exercise force in the protection or promotion of such interests.
51.
To do so would, in the words of General Powell, "...destroy the ambiguity we might want to exist in our enemy's mind regarding our intentions".
Powell 38.
52. An "appropriate" degree of force refers to the need to deploy the "sufficient" degree of U.S. military force required to provide the U.S. with a realistic opportunity to resolve a particular situation in an effective and decisive manner. Such an approach augers against "incrementalism".
53.
This is, perhaps, the essential criterion. The protection or promotion of the particular national interest in issue must be worth the resulting loss in American lives -and capital.
In the words of General Powell, "...IT]he use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue".
Powell 40. Moreover, decision makers must be alert to the fact that the American people, Congress, and the media will engage in a daily "cost-benefit" analysis.
54.
This criterion attempts to ensure the avoidance of political/military "quagmires"
The accomplishment of the mission in issue must be possible to achieve within a "reasonable" period of time.
It can be neither ill-defined, nor open-ended.
Again, the American public will refuse to sanction these forms of uncertainty.
55.
In the author's view, these forms of previously agreed arrangements are essential to the successful participation of U.S. forces in U.N./coalition use of force actions.
56.
See text, p. 7.
The underlined text reflects the author's changes in the "humanitarian relief" criteria articulated by President Bush.
57.
See text, p. 22, and endnote 48.
